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IS COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY REALLY PRIMITIVE? 
 
Elisabeth Pacherie 
Institut Jean Nicod 
CNRS-ENS-EHESS, Paris 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of Searle's book, The Construction of Social Reality, is to provide a 
conceptual foundation for the social sciences. The project is mainly ontological. Searle 
is a convinced monist. He believes that there is but one world, whose most fundamental 
features are described by the natural sciences. Prima facie, it is not obvious how certain 
phenomena of central concern to human beings in general and to philosophers in 
particular can be accommodated within a unitary physicalist ontology. Much of Searle's 
earlier philosophical work has been devoted to investigating how this could be done for 
linguistic and mental phenomena. The Construction of Social Reality  extends the 
investigation to social phenomena and attempts to develop a general theory of the 
ontology of social facts and institutions. Searle sets out to show how complex social 
phenomena can be accounted for using a limited number of conceptual tools. His 
theoretical apparatus comprises four main elements. The first three — the assignment of 
agentive functions, collective intentionality, and constitutive rules — are introduced and 
described in the first chapter of the book. The fourth element, what Searle calls the 
Background, is introduced in chapter VI to explain the causal functioning of 
institutional structures.  
In this paper, I shall be concerned mainly with collective intentionality and the account 
Searle gives of this notion. I shall also discuss the Background insofar as collective 
intentionality is taken to presuppose certain specific Background capacities. Searle 
argues that collective intentionality is irreducible to individual intentional behavior and 
should be considered as a biologically primitive phenomenon. Although I agree that 
collective intentionality is irreducible to individual intentionality in a certain sense, I do 
not think that collective intentionality must be either reducible to individual 
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intentionality or biologically primitive. I will start by discussing Searle's account of 
collective intentionality and how it is constrained by his further commitments to 
individualism and to internalism. I will also indicate what I find the shortcomings of this 
account to be (section 2 and 3). The fourth section will outline an alternative account of 
collective intentionality that, I hope, overcomes some of these shortcomings without 
being subject to the objections Searle addresses to reductive analyses. In the fifth 
section, I will discuss the capacities needed to sustain collective intentionality according 
to this alternative account. In the last section, I will briefly examine what becomes of 
Searle's requirements of individualism and internalism on this account.  
 
2. Searlian intuitions 
The notion of collective intentionality plays a crucial role in Searle's account of social 
reality. Of the three conceptual tools introduced in the first chapter of the book, it may 
be deemed the most central. It is indeed a defining feature of social facts since, for 
Searle (p. 26), any fact involving collective intentionality qualifies as a social fact. By 
contrast, agentive function is not criterial of social facts since there can be singular as 
well as collective assignment of agentive functions on objects. As for constitutive rules, 
they are involved only in one special subclass of social facts, namely institutional facts. 
Despite its centrality, collective intentionality is characterized rather cursorily in The 
Construction of Social Reality  and,  for a more detailed account of this notion, one 
must revert to an earlier paper of Searle's (Searle, 1990).  
Searle's view of collective intentionality is based on a twofold intuition. The first part of 
the intuition — that there is collective intentional behavior as distinct from individual 
intentional behavior — is hardly controversial. Searle offers two reasons for thinking 
that collective intentional behavior is not the same as the summation of individual 
intentional behavior. The first is that the same type of bodily movements can on one 
occasion be a set of individual acts and on another occasion constitute a collective 
action. Searle illustrates this point by way of the following example: 
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places in a park. 
Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a common, 
centrally located shelter. Each person has the intention expressed by the sentence 
"I am running to the shelter". But for each person, we may suppose that his or her 
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intentions is entirely independent of the intentions and behavior of others. In this 
case there is no collective behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that 
happens to converge on a common goal. Now imagine a case where a group of 
people in a park converge on a common point as a piece of collective behavior. 
Imagine that they are part of an outdoor ballet where the choreography calls for 
the entire corps de ballet to converge on a common point. We can imagine that the 
external bodily movements are indistinguishable  in the two cases; the people  
running to the shelter make the same types of bodily movements as the ballet 
dancers. Externally observed, the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are 
clearly internally different. (Searle, 1990: 402-403) 
The problem then is to specify what this internal difference consists in. One important 
clue is that in the first situation the convergence on a common goal is a mere accident. 
The intention and behavior of each individual is entirely independent of the intentions 
and behavior of others. Moreover, as Searle remarks, this is so even if each person 
knows that the other people intend to run to the shelter and knows that the other people 
know that he or she intends to run to the shelter. Searle claims that in the second 
situation, by contrast, the individual "I intend"s are derivative from the "we intend"s. 
The second reason for thinking that collective intentional behavior is not the same as the 
summation of individual intentional behavior is that "often the derived form of an 
individual intention will have a different content from the collective intention from 
which it is derived" (Searle, 1990: 403). The example Searle gives is that of a football 
team trying to execute a pass play. No individual member of the team can have 'we are 
executing a pass play' as the entire content of his intention, for no one can execute a pass 
play by himself. Each player will must make a specific contribution to the overall goal.  
The more controversial part of Searle's intuition is that collective intentions, what he 
calls we-intentions, cannot be analyzed into sets of I-intentions, even supplemented with 
beliefs, including mutual beliefs about the intentions of other members of a group. 
Notice that this claim is much stronger than the mere claim that collective intentional 
behavior is different from the summation of individual intentional behavior. The claim 
is that no analysis of collective intentions in terms of individual intentions is 
forthcoming whatever their combination is, whatever their contents are, and whatever 
other individual mental states they are supplemented with. Searle acknowledges that he 
cannot prove that no such analysis could ever succeed, but he claims that all reductive 
analyses that he has seen are subject to obvious counter-examples. The next section will 
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consider what motivates Searle's introduction of we-intentions and whether the 
construal he offers of this notion should be accepted. 
 
3. What are we-intentions? 
According to Searle, reductive analyses fail to account for the cooperative and 
coordinated character of collective intentionality. More precisely, reductionist strategies, 
such as Tuomela and Miller's (1988), try to account for the cooperative dimension of 
collective actions in terms of mutual beliefs among members of a group. What Searle 
shows through counter-examples is that the existence of mutual beliefs is not sufficient 
to ensure cooperation. Thus, business school graduates who have been exposed to Adam 
Smith's theory of the hidden hand may come to believe that the best way for somebody 
to help humanity is by pursuing his own selfish interests. Each may form a separate 
intention to thus help humanity by pursuing his own selfish interests and not 
cooperating with anybody and they may all have mutual beliefs to the effect that each 
has such an intention. In such a case, despite all the businessmen having the same goal 
as well as mutual beliefs about their respective intentions, there is no cooperation and 
no collective action. What they lack is an intention to cooperate mutually. Mutual 
beliefs among members of a group do not ensure the presence of such an intention.  
According to Searle, this cooperative dimension of collective actions can be captured 
only if it is accepted that the intentions attributable to the individuals that take part in 
collective actions are different in type from the intentions attributable to those same 
individuals when they engage in individual actions. The idea then is that to account for 
cooperation we have to introduce a specific type of mental states: we-intentions. What 
needs to be spelled out is the sense in which we-intentions are special and, relatedly, the 
sense in which they can be said to imply cooperation. Prima facie, three possibilities are 
conceivable. The first is that what makes we-intentions special is features of their 
contents and thus that the dimension of cooperation is linked to specific features of 
these contents. The second is that what makes we-intentions special has to do with the 
type of entities they can be attributed to. Finally the third possibility is that rather than 
the contents or the possible bearers of we-intentions, it is the psychological mode itself 
— i.e., the fact that the psychological mode is that of we-intending instead of I-
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intending — that implies the notion of cooperation. Before we examine each possibility 
in turn, let me note that they are not mutually incompatible: we-intentions could in 
principle be special in all three ways.  
The first possibility is that we-intentions are special in that their contents have specific 
features not shared by I-intentions. One could then claim that what is specific of the 
content of a we-intention is that I-intentions, related in a certain way, are embedded in 
it. To borrow Searle's example of two cooks, say Paul and Gilbert, preparing a 
hollandaise sauce together, the content of the we-intentions would be something like 
(that this collective intention causes Paul to have the I-intention to stir while Gilbert is 
pouring and Gilbert to have the I-intention to pour while Paul is stirring). According to 
this conception, what would make we-intentions a sui generis type of mental states are 
certain unique features of their contents, namely that further intentions fall in their 
scope, and what would capture the dimension of cooperation would be the way those 
embedded intentions are related. This is not the option Searle favors. Searle thinks such 
an analysis cannot be right for two reasons. First, because it would involve attributing 
two separate intentions to each agent, for instance in the case of Paul a we-intention to 
prepare the sauce and an I-intention to stir. Second, because the we-intention of each 
agent would have to be an intention to make it the case that he have a singular intention. 
Although Searle is not explicit why he thinks that these consequences of this analysis 
are unacceptable, I gather that the reason why he rejects them is that they do not seem to 
accord with the phenomenology of the agents involved in a cooperative activity.  
What he proposes instead is that the content of collective intentions is of a form already 
present in some complex cases of singular intentions. Namely, the content of the 
intention encompasses a by-means-of relation. The idea is that in the case of singular 
intention of, e.g., firing a gun by pulling the trigger, there is only one intention and one 
action, with the relation of the means-intention to the overall intention being only part-
whole. Similarly, for Searle, in the case of collective actions, there is only one complex: 
the singular intentions of the agents are related to the collective intentions as means to 
ends and this relation of the singular intentions to the collective intention is simply part-
whole. It is important to note that there is nothing in the by-means-of relation per se that 
implies cooperation. For instance, I can intend that we go to the police station by means 
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of me dragging you, and clearly in such a case no cooperation need be involved. Thus, 
there is nothing in the analysis Searle offers of the form of the content of collective 
intentions that makes it necessary that the dimension of cooperation essential to 
collective intentions be reflected in their contents. Indeed, Searle insists that: "The real 
distinction between the singular and the collective case is in the type of the intention 
involved, not in the way that the elements in the conditions of satisfaction relate to each 
other" (1990: 412). 
Let us now turn to the second possibility, namely that the specificity of collective 
intentions is related to the type of entities we-intentions can be attributed to. The idea 
here is that whereas I-intentions are typically attributed to individuals, there are further 
constraints an entity must meet for we-intentions to be attributable to it. This move can 
be made in two different ways. One is to admit the existence of some forms of primitive 
collective entities, such as group minds, collective consciousnesses, or Hegelian world 
spirits. Primitive here means that those entities are conceived as sui generis and not as 
constructions assembled from more elementary entities (in the way, say, that molecules 
are collections of atoms assembled in a certain way). Searle, quite reasonably I take it, 
sees the existence of such entities as widely implausible. He intends his account of 
collective intentionality to be consistent with methodological individualism, that is with 
the fact that society consists of nothing but individuals and that all the intentionality 
there is in the minds of individuals. Thus, it will not do to say that collective intentions 
form a specific type of states insofar as they are the privilege of primitive collective 
entities. 
But there is also an other move that can be made. Instead of saying that we-intentions 
are to be attributed to primitive collective entities, one could suggest that the proper 
bearers of we-intentions are individuals related in a certain way both among themselves 
and with their environment. Of course for such a strategy to have a chance of success, 
the relations that must obtain among individuals for them to qualify as bearers of we-
intentions would have to be describable in a non-circular way. It other words, it should 
not be the case that the ability to enter into such relations presupposes collective 
intentionality. Whether a non-circular account of these intersubjective relations is 
feasible is something we shall consider in the next section. It should be noted however 
 E. Pacherie - Searle - Collective intentionality - 7/12/98 - 7 
that this kind of move would be rejected by Searle. For Searle wants his account of 
collective intentionality to meet a further constraint besides methodological 
individualism. Searle is a dyed-in-the-wool internalist. Not only does he want all 
intentionality to be in individual minds or brains, he also maintains that all the 
intentionality an individual has could be had by this individual even if he or she were a 
brain in a vat. In other words, Searle also wants an account of collective intentionality to 
meet the following constraint: "It should be consistent with the fact that the structure of 
any individual's intentionality has to be independent of the fact of whether or not he is 
getting things right, whether or not he is radically mistaken about what is actually 
occurring" (1990: 406). The reason why adherence to this constraint is incompatible 
with pursuing the strategy just described should be rather obvious. For a relation to 
obtain, the relata must exist. But to say, as Searle does, that I could have all the 
collective intentionality I have if I were a brain in vat, is to say that I could have all the 
collective intentionality I have even if there existed no other individuals for me to be 
related to.  
So, the only possibility left open for Searle is the third one, namely, that what makes 
we-intentions special is the psychological mode itself, not the possible subjects of we-
intentions nor their contents. Now, Searle also wants his view of collective 
intentionality as a primitive form of intentionality to satisfy the two constraints of 
individualism and internalism, the more so since the reason why he rejects some 
alternative proposals is that they flout either individualism or internalism. He maintains 
that these two constraints are in fact rather easily satisfied. In order to see that his 
conception of collective intentionality as primitive is consistent with individualism, it is 
enough, according to Searle, to "note that all the intentionality needed for collective 
behavior can be possessed by individual agents even though the intentionality in 
question makes reference to the collective" (1990: 407). And to see that it is consistent 
with internalism, it suffices to note that "collective intentionality in my head can make a 
purported reference to other members of a collective independently of the question 
whether or not there actually are such members" (1990: 407). 
This analysis appears less than satisfactory for at least two reasons. First, Searle's 
contention that a single individual, even if he happens to be a brain in a vat, can have a 
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collective intentionality seems difficult to understand. Searle himself acknowledges that 
his analysis has an uncomfortable feature. Namely: 
[I]t allows for a form of mistake that is not simply a failure to achieve the 
conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state and is not simply a breakdown in 
the Background. It allows for the fact that I may be mistaken in taking it that the 
"we" in the "we intend" actually refers to a we, that is, it allows for the fact that 
my presupposition that my intentionality is collective may be mistaken  in ways 
that go beyond the fact that I have a mistaken belief. [...] on my account, it turns 
out  that I can not only be mistaken about how the world is but am even mistaken 
about what I am doing.  If I am having an hallucination in supposing that someone 
else is helping me push the car, that I am only pushing as part of our pushing, then 
I am mistaken not only in my belief that there is somebody else there pushing as 
well but also about what it is that I am doing. I thought I was pushing as part of 
our pushing, but that is not in fact what I am doing. (1990: 408) 
It seems to me that this admission of Searle's clearly contradicts his claim that his 
analysis of collective intentionality is consistent with internalism, i. e., consistent with 
the fact that all intentionality, whether collective or individual, could be had by a brain 
in a vat or a set of brains in vat. For what exactly is the special form of mistake Searle is 
referring to in the passage just quoted? Searle says that the hallucinating individual is 
mistaken about what he is in fact doing. How should we understand this claim? Searle 
(1983) identifies an action not just with a series of bodily movements, but with the 
bodily movements together with the intention in action that causes them.1 Clearly it is 
not just the case that the hallucinating individual is mistaken about the kind of bodily 
movements he is performing, for this individual could be right that he is actually 
pushing the car and yet be mistaken in supposing that someone else is helping him. So 
in saying that the individual is mistaken about what he is in fact doing, Searle 
                                                 
1 Searle (1983) proposes a distinction between two types of intentions, what he calls intentions-in-action 
and prior intentions. In his terminology, a 'prior intention' corresponds to the initial representation of the 
goal of the action prior to the initiation of the action, whereas an intention in action is the proximal cause 
of the physiological chain leading to overt behavior. Prior intentions and intentions in action are said to 
differ in their contents: Searle claims that whereas the content of intentions in action presents physical 
movements, the content of prior intentions represents whole actions, that is, not just a physical movement, 
but the causal sequence consisting of the intention in action causing the physical movement. Moreover, 
Searle points out that the content of an intention of action is much more determinate than the content of a 
prior intention, meaning that my intention in action to raise my arm, for instance, will include not only that 
my arm goes up, but that it goes up in a certain way, at a certain speed, etc. According to Searle, another 
important difference between prior intentions and intentions in action that not all intentional actions have 
prior intentions in actions but all intentional actions have intentions in action, where an intention in action 
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presumably means that he is mistaken about the kind of intention in action he has. 
Searle says that the individual may be mistaken in taking it that the "we" in the "we 
intend" actually refers to a we. But what could this mean other than that what the 
individual assumes is a collective intention in action is not actually a genuine one? What 
could this mean other than that the hallucinating individual is deluded in thinking that 
he has a we-intention. For Searle's analysis to be consistent with internalism it would 
have to be the case that a brain in vat can have genuine collective intentions, not just it 
can think it has. But if the brain in a vat is wrong in thinking that it has a collective 
intention, then clearly it doesn't have one. Therefore, it seems that, contrary to what 
Searle claims, his analysis is not consistent with internalism. An individual cannot 
properly be said to have a collective intention unless other individuals actually share his 
intention.  
A second problematic feature in Searle's analysis has to do with the dimension of 
intersubjectivity, a dimension that is glossed by Searle in terms of agreement and 
cooperation. Recall that, according to Searle, the businessmen pursuing their own 
selfish interests in order to help humanity would have constituted a case of collective 
intentionality if they had all got together on graduation day and agreed to so act. Recall 
also, that according to Searle, what  the Tuomela-Miller analysis fails to account for is 
the notion of cooperation that is built into collective action. Well, does Searle's analysis 
fare any better? Nothing in the structure of the content of we-intentions as laid out by 
Searle seems to capture the notion of cooperation. As we have already noted, there is 
nothing in the by-means-of relation per se that implies cooperation. I can intend that we 
go to the police station by means of me dragging you, and clearly in such a case no 
cooperation need be involved. So how does cooperation enter the stage? According to 
Searle, in order to account for the cooperative character of we-intentions, we must 
appeal to Background capacities. What collective intentionality presupposes is "a 
Background sense of the other as candidate for cooperative agency; that is, it 
presupposes a sense of others as more than mere conscious agents, indeed as actual or 
potential members of a cooperative activity" (1990: 414). Now, Background capacities, 
according to Searle, are not themselves representational. Rather, they are a set of 
                                                                                                                                               
does not simply trigger bodily movements but plays a continuing causal role in shaping them, guiding and 
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nonintentional or preintentional capacities that enable intentional states of function. In 
other words, they are biological or neurophysiological phenomena rather than 
intentional phenomena. As Fisette (1997) points out, by drawing a line between the 
realm of the intentional and the Background, and by considering that the dimension of 
cooperation is part of the Background, Searle acknowledges that he cannot account for it 
in intentional terms. From this it follows, that a theory of collective intentionality cannot 
per se provide a conceptual foundation for the social sciences. If cooperation is indeed 
an essential dimension of social phenomena, and cooperation is part of the Background, 
providing a conceptual foundation for the social sciences is ultimately a job for the 
biologist, not for the philosopher.  
To sum up, I disagree with Searle on two counts. First, to insist that an account of 
collective intentionality should meet the constraint of internalism seems to me close to 
an absurdity. It is one thing to claim that all the intentionality there is, including 
collective intentionality is in the head of individuals. It is another to insist that collective 
intentionality could be had by a single individual, not to mention a brain in vat. The first 
claim is at least plausible, the second seems to me unintelligible. Second, while there is 
no denying that all our cognitive capacities rest on an underlying basis of biological 
capacities, it appears to me unduly hasty to sweep cooperation under the rug of 
Background presuppositions. Although a capacity for cooperation may depend in part on 
certain background biological capacities, I think it can also be construed in part in 
intentional terms. These two difficulties with Searle's account are not unrelated. It is, I 
think, Searle's adherence to internalism that prevents him to see how cooperation can be 
accounted for, at least in part, in intentional terms.  
 
4. An alternative proposal 
In this section, I will briefly present another proposal, made by Bratman, which I think 
fares better with regard to the elucidation of the main features of collective 
intentionality, even though it is not without its own problems. Bratman agrees with 
Searle that collective intentional behavior is not analyzable as just the summation of 
individual intentional behavior even supplemented by mutual beliefs or mutual 
                                                                                                                                               
monitoring them until completion. 
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knowledge. Yet contrary to Searle, he thinks that collective intentionality is not a 
primitive phenomenon and that a non-circular reductive analysis may be possible. 
Bratman (1992) identifies three features of shared cooperative activities that such an 
analysis would have to account for. The first feature is the mutual responsiveness of 
each participating agent to the intentions and actions of the others. The second is a 
commitment to a joint activity. The third is a commitment to mutual support by which 
each agent is committed to supporting the efforts of the other to play her role in the joint 
activity. None of these features is by itself sufficient to make an activity a shared 
cooperative activity, but, according to Bratman, taken together these three features are 
characteristic of shared cooperative activities.  
Bratman is careful to ensure that his analysis is non-circular. In this regard the notion of 
a commitment to a joint activity may seem suspect. First, it may appear that cooperation 
is built into the notion of joint activity. Here, Bratman is careful to distinguish joint act 
types that are cooperatively neutral from those that are cooperatively loaded. For 
instance, we can go to New-York together without our activity being cooperative. He 
makes it clear that in his analysis the feature of commitment to a joint activity should be 
read in a cooperatively neutral way. Second, one may wonder whether it makes sense to 
appeal to my intention that we do something together, insofar as it may be thought that 
one can only intend one's own actions. Here, Bratman introduces a distinction between 
intending and attempting and defends a planning conception of intentions that 
emphasizes the role of future-directed intentions as elements of partial plans.2 This 
conception of intentions allows him to be more liberal about what can be intended than 
                                                 
2 Bratman's (1987) theory of intentions emphasizes the role of intentions in planning and reasoning. 
Intentions are not only terminators of practical reasoning, they are also prompters of practical reasoning. 
This is what Bratman calls the reasoning-centered dimension of the commitment to action characteristic of 
intentions. Intentions play an important role as inputs into further practical reasoning, as, e. g., means-ends 
reasoning, reasoning from more general to more specific intentions, or reasoning as to which other 
intentions are consistent with a given intention. They are thus "typically elements in larger plans, plans 
which facilitate coordination both socially and within our own lives, plans which enable prior deliberation 
to shape later conduct" (1987: 28). Bratman's distinguishes between future-directed intentions —
concerned with future courses of action — and present-directed intentions — intentions to act in a certain 
way beginning now. Obviously, the reasoning-centered dimension of commitment is characteristic of 
future-directed intentions. Whatever practical reasoning the agents engages in, it will have occurred prior 
to the time of action. Future-directed intention are thus central in his theory. 
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about what can be attempted since references to things other than our own actions can 
function appropriately in our plans.  
Since Bratman construes commitment to a joint activity in a cooperatively neutral way, 
this commitment does not suffice to ensure that the activity that follows is a shared 
cooperative activity or a collective action in Searle's sense. The originality of Bratman's 
analysis comes from the way in which he construes the two further features of mutual 
responsiveness and commitment to mutual support. These are analyzed in terms of 
meshing subplans and interdependent intentions. For an activity to be a shared 
cooperative activity, it must be the case that each agent intends that the group performs 
this joint action in accordance with subplans that mesh, where for subplans to mesh it is 
not necessary that there be full agreement in the agents' subplans, but merely that there 
be some way the action can be done that would involve the successful execution of 
those individual subplans. For instance, if John and Mary intend that they paint the 
house together, but Mary intends that they paint  it red all over, and Peter that they paint 
it blue all over, then their respective subplans concerning the color of the paint don't 
mesh. If, by contrast, Peter intends that they paint the house blue all over but has no 
preference as to where they should buy the paint, whereas Mary does not care about the 
color but intends that they buy the paint at a particular store, then their respective 
subplans mesh. This meshing of subplans in turn implies that the intentions of the 
participating agents must be interlocking. Each agent should bring into the content of 
his intention the efficacy of the other participants' intentions as well as the efficacy of 
his own intentions. By thus requiring that the intentions of the participating agents be 
interlocking, Bratman moves away from the classical reductive analyses of collective 
action according to which the crucial link among the attitudes of the participating agents 
is simply cognitive. Mutual belief or mutual knowledge is not sufficient to ensure that 
intention is shared or collective; but neither is it necessary to posit collective 
intentionality as a primitive form of intentionality. What is crucial is the specific form of 
interdependence of the individual intentions. Finally, insofar as the intention of each 
participant includes his intending that the relevant intentions of the others be 
successfully executed, commitment to mutual support is also involved in shared 
cooperative activities. As Bratman phrases it, the intentions of the participants should be 
 E. Pacherie - Searle - Collective intentionality - 7/12/98 - 13 
minimally cooperatively stable. In other words, there must be at least some 
circumstances in which each participant would be prepared to help the others do their 
part in the joint activity.  
These conditions essential for shared cooperative activity are summarized by Bratman 
(1992: 338) in the following way: 
Where J is a cooperatively neutral joint-act type, our J-ing is a shared cooperative 
activity only if: 
(1) (a) (i)  I intend that we J. 
(1) (a) (ii)  I intend that we J in accordance with and because of meshing 
 subplans of (1) (a) (i) and (1) (b) (i). 
(1) (b) (i)  You intend that we J. 
(1) (b) (ii)  You intend that we J in accordance with and because of meshing 
 subplans of (1) (a) (i) and (1) (b) (i). 
(1) (c)   The intentions in (1) (a) and (1) (b) are minimally cooperatively 
 stable. 
(2)   It is common knowledge between us that (1) 
Here, conditions (1) (a) (i) and (1) (b) (1) are meant to capture the feature of 
commitment to a joint activity; Conditions (1) (a) (ii) and (1) (b) (ii) to capture the 
feature of mutual responsiveness, and condition (1) (c) the feature of commitment to 
mutual support.  
Bratman's analysis appears to me more satisfactory than Searle's. It does not lay open to 
the criticism Searle addresses to traditional reductive analyses of collective 
intentionality since it does not maintain that the crucial link among the attitudes of 
agents involved in collective behavior is a purely cognitive link. It brings to the fore 
three essential features of shared intentions, that are not taken into account by traditional 
analyses. Finally, contrary to Searle, it tries to capture what is distinctive of shared 
intentions in terms of a special kind of interdependence of the individual intentions of 
the participants, rather than by postulating a mysterious form of primitive collective 
intentionality supposed to be in the head of individual agents. Earlier, I distinguished 
three different ways in which we-intentions could be conceived as special. According to 
the first, what makes we-intentions special are features of their contents, according to 
the second what makes them special has to do with the type of entities they can be 
attributed to, and, according to the third, what is special is the psychological mode itself. 
We have seen that the option favored by Searle was the third one. I think Bratman's 
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position can be characterized as a mix between the first and the second option. 
According to Bratman, the contents of the intentions of individuals involved in 
collective action are special insofar as they make reference to the intentions of the other 
participants — each agent must have intentions in favor of the efficacy of the intentions 
of the others — and are reflexive as well — each agent must have intentions concerning 
the efficacy of their own intentions.3  But collective intentions seem also to be special 
insofar as they cannot only be attributed to individuals related in a certain way. Indeed, 
Bratman's choice of words provides a good indication. He does not speak of collective 
intentions, but rather of shared intentions. Trivially, for an intention to be shared, there 
must be at least two individuals to share it. Thus, on Bratman's view, the idea that a 
brain in a vat could have a collective intention is simply incoherent. A brain in a vat 
even if the content of his intention makes purported reference to the intentions of 
purported others does not have a collective intention. To speak of a collective intention, 
it is necessary that the intentions of each participant mesh with the intentions of the 
others, hence that there exist others.  
Despite its illuminating character, Bratman's analysis is not totally unproblematic. The 
condition of mutual knowledge he proposes is notoriously difficult to satisfy and one 
may wonder whether such a strong condition is really necessary. In particular, if one 
supposes that mutual explicitation of intentions and plans requires resorting to verbal 
communication, it becomes doubtful whether an analysis such as Bratman's could really 
be useful given Searle's general project. For Searle, a capacity for collective behavior is 
a condition of possibility of the institution of language, and not vice-versa, even though 
of course, language makes possible new forms of collective behavior. If we think that 
the satisfaction of Bratman's mutual knowledge condition requires resorting to language, 
we cannot without circularity substitute his analysis of shared intention to Searle's while 
preserving Searle's general explanatory project. 
A second drawback of Bratman's analysis, at least relative to Searle's overall project, is 
that the characterization he offers seems tailored to forms of shared cooperative 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that whereas for Searle all intentions, whether individual or collective involve a kind 
of self-referentiality, Bratman thinks that self-referentiality is a feature specific of collective intentional 
actions.  
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activities that are already rather sophisticated. Bratman's analysis focuses on future-
directed intentions, that involve rational deliberation and conscious planning, whereas  
Searle's analysis is at the level of intentions in action. One may therefore wonder 
whether his analysis still applies when one considers more elementary forms of 
collective behavior.  
 
5. What cognitive capacities are needed for collective intentions and actions 
One way to approach this question is to examine what kinds of cognitive capacities one 
must attribute to an agent for her to be able to be a participant in collective actions. By 
proceeding to such an examination, we may be able to do two things. First, we may be 
able to offer a more detailed articulation of the kind of capacities Searle locates in the 
Background, where these capacities may be characterized at least in part in 
psychological terms rather than directly in biological terms. Second, this may help us 
define a notion of mutual accessibility of intentions less demanding than Bratman's 
requirement of mutual knowledge. Obviously, it would be impossible to do justice in 
the space of a few paragraphs to the enormous literature already available. What I hope 
to do is simply to give some idea of the kinds of investigations potentially relevant to a 
characterization of the cognitive capacities that underlie collective intentionality.   
I shall focus on two essential capacities and their interplay. The first is a capacity for 
planning. Collective action presupposes a capacity for coordinating one's own intentions 
and actions with those of the other participating agents. However, as Bratman's (1987) 
work shows, this capacity for planning and coordination is not required solely for 
collective action. Even in the case of individual actions, intrapersonal coordination is 
needed. In particular, individual intentions and actions are subject to consistency 
constraints. First, plans must be internally consistent: the intentions that are the 
constitutive elements of a plan must be mutually consistent, for it to be possible that the 
entire plan be successfully executed. Second, plans must also be 'externally consistent', 
that is consistent with the beliefs of the agents about the world she is in. Third, there is 
also a demand for means-end coherence: the means chosen must be adapted to the end 
pursued and, although plans are initially typically partial, they must be appropriately 
filled in as time goes by.  
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Bratman is mainly concerned with future-directed intentions and thus with forms of 
high-level planning. But planning and coordination take place at a number of levels, 
from the basic level of simple motor commands up to conscious deliberation about 
plans. For instance, work in the cognitive neuroscience of action shows that even 
actions as simple and seemingly automatic as eye saccades are controlled by sets of 
predictive mechanisms that allow for an internal simulation of eye movements in the 
absence of overt saccades and thus allow for a selection to be made among alternative 
actions (Berthoz, 1996). Of course the neural mechanisms that control eye-saccades are 
low-level mechanisms whose workings are not consciously accessible. Therefore, by 
Searle's standards the types of simulations they allow would not count as mental 
simulations: we are in the domain of the non-intentional, biological capacities that for 
Searle belong to the Background.  
Yet, there are intermediate levels of planning between those that depend on these low-
level neural mechanisms and the high-level capacities considered by Bratman. Of 
particular interest are those levels of planning through simulation that can give rise to 
conscious experience and thus to what is called motor imagery. According to 
researchers working on motor imagery (Decety & Ingvar, 1990; Decety, 1996, 
Jeannerod, 1994, 1997), the same neurophysiological mechanisms subserve both 
imagined and actually executed actions. There is thus a close relationship between 
motor imagery and what Searle (1983) calls the experience of acting — that which gives 
us a conscious access to the intentional content of our intentions in action. As 
emphasized by Jeannerod (1994), the experimental study of motor imagery may thus be 
a perspicuous way of investigating the content of intentions in action and of clarifying 
both what its elements are and how they are encoded4. Moreover, the study of motor 
imagery may shed light on a form of planning that is pitched at the level of intentions in 
action. Thus, the existence of a capacity for conscious motor simulation may be a key to 
understanding how some forms of intrapersonal as well as interpersonal coordination 
can be achieved. Of course this capacity will ultimately depend on more primitive 
capacities that are non-intentional and can only be characterized  in purely 
                                                 
4 For much more detailed discussions on how work in the cognitive neuroscience of action can shed light 
on issues in the philosophy of action, see Pacherie, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b. 
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neurophysiological terms, but it would be premature to claim that all the capacities 
needed for collective intentionality belong to the Background.  
A second capacity that one must possess in order to participate in collective actions is a 
capacity to attribute mental states to oneself and others and to explain and predict 
behavior on that basis. How this capacity should be construed is currently the object of 
much debate. On the one hand, theory theorists maintain that in order to impute mental 
states to herself and others an individual must possess a body of knowledge about 
cognition and motivation that is theory-like. On the other hand, the simulationist 
approach contends that such a capacity can be construed as a capacity to imaginatively 
identify with someone else and to imagine the situation the person is in. One important 
difference between the two approaches is that on the theory-theory view engagement in 
folk-psychological practice requires the possession of psychological concepts such as 
the concept of belief, whereas on the simulationist approach, such mastery is not 
required. On the latter view, it is enough, for instance, that by imaginatively identifying 
with someone else, one imaginatively believes (desires, intends, …)  this or that. There 
are at present various versions of each approach as well as hybrid variants that take the 
two approaches to be complementary rather than rival.5   
Certain recent data in the neurophysiology of action seem to provide evidence in favor 
of the simulationist approach. A new class of visuomotor neurons has been recently 
discovered in the monkey's premotor cortex (Rizzolatti et al. 1988; Di Pellegrino et al. 
1992). These so-called mirror neurons respond both when a particular action is 
performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another 
individual, is observed. Mirror neurons thus appear to form a cortical system matching 
observation and execution of goal-directed motor-action. These findings have been 
extended to human subjects in a recent studies of PET studies (Decety et al., 1994, 
1997; Grafton et al., 1996, Rizzolatti et al., 1996, Stephan et al., 1995). These studies 
provide evidence for the existence of a cortical network common to conditions where 
subjects are intending actions, preparing for execution, mentally simulating actions and 
observing actions performed by other individuals. As suggested by Gallese and 
Goldman (1998), one possible function of these structures may be to enable an organism 
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to detect certain mental states of observed conspecifics. This function may be part of, or 
a precursor to, a more general mind-reading ability relying on a capacity to adopt a 
simulation routine.  
A general discussion of the debate between theory theory and simulation theory falls 
beyond the scope of this paper and my purpose is certainly not to try to adjudicate 
between the two approaches. Rather, my point is that the existence of such philosophical 
and psychological theorizing shows that rather than directly appealing to a biologically 
primitive sense of the other person as a candidate for shared intentionality, one can 
usefully investigate the nature of the psychological mechanisms that enable human 
beings to attribute mental states to others and to see things from their perspective.  
It should be noted that neither of the two capacities just discussed — a capacity for 
planning and coordination and a capacity for mind-reading — is specifically tied to 
collective action. Both capacities are already involved in individual behavior. Yet, for 
collective intentionality to be possible, it must be the case that these two capacities are 
integrated and thus work together. In particular, this integration is necessary for the 
interlocking of intentions which, according to Bratman, is a central characteristic of 
shared intentions. In other words, for shared cooperative activity to be possible, it is not 
enough that each individual be capable of attributing to the other participants intentions 
similar to his own. It is also necessary that (1) each agent be capable of imagining both 
the third-person information available to the other agents in the situation considered and 
their first-person orientation toward this situation, (2) that each agent be capable of 
imagining the third-person information and the first-person orientation that the others 
attribute to him, and (3) that each agent be capable of repeatedly switching perspective 
in order to reach interpersonal coordination6. Presumably, the integration of planning 
                                                                                                                                               
5 On this debate, see for instance, Davies and Stone, 1995a, 1995b or Carruthers and Smith,1996. 
6 It may well be objected that these requirements are too strong. Indeed, it doubtful whether certain social 
animals capable of collective actions — a pack of wolves performing collective hunting, for instance — 
are endowed with such sophisticated cognitive capacities. It is also doubtful whether each time human 
beings engage in collective action, those capacities are at play. Here, it may be useful to draw a distinction 
between the kinds of (individual or  collective) actions that are part of the repertoire of a given species 
and are to some degree preprogrammed, and those that need to be learned. Another useful distinction is 
between learning in the sense of assembling a new action program and learning in the sense of adjusting 
parameters in a preexisting action program. Presumably, human beings learn how to drive a car in the first 
sense, but they learn how to walk only in the second sense. Now, it may be suggested that collective 
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and mind-reading capacities requires a fair amount of cognitive resources, including a 
capacious working memory and a relatively sophisticated level of executive function. 
Yet, once again those working memory and executive function capacities are not 
specifically tied to collective intentionality, they are also involved in a number of 
cognitive activities, such as problem-solving, that are not essentially linked to collective 
behavior.  
What this brief sketch of the kind of capacities involved in collective intentions and 
actions is meant to suggest is that, in order to account for the capacity to engage in 
collective behavior, one does not need to appeal (at least in the first instance) to specific 
Background capacities. An explanation can be couched in terms of the psychological 
endowment of human beings, where the psychological capacities appealed are not 
specifically dedicated to the production of collective behavior but fulfill a number of 
roles in the cognitive life of human beings. This discussion of the capacities underlying 
collective intentionality and action may also help see how to replace Bratman's 
requirement of mutual knowledge with a weaker requirement. Rather than of mutual 
knowledge, which seems to require explicit communication, I propose that we speak of 
mutual presumption, namely the presumption that the other agents are sufficiently 
cognitively similar to us that their attitudes and intentions can be successfully simulated 
or inferred. Because such a presumption can be mistaken, our intentions regarding 
collective actions are fallible, in other words, they are themselves presumptive. If 
follows that the actual existence of shared intentions is not something that can be 
established with certainty prior to the action itself. It is the satisfaction of the mutual 
expectations of the agents, the support given when problems arise that warrant the 
reality of presumptive shared intentions. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
hunting in wolves is part of the innate repertoire of the species. If such is the case, it is certainly 
superfluous to attribute to them the kind of imaginative and perspective-taking capacities just listed, it is 
probably enough that they be able to exploit certain environmental and behavioral cues that are associated 
with given steps in the action program. Even given a prepackaged action program, wolves may have to 
learn how to hunt collectively, but then only in the second sense of learning how to adjust certain 
parameters. By contrast, it seems to me that learning novel types of collective actions requires the 
integration of planning and mind-reading capacities, even if, once those new forms of collective actions 
are well-practiced, the exploitation of behavioral cues may suffice for successful performance.  In any 
case, if collective intentionality is to be used as a conceptual tool for explaining social and institutional 
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6. Concluding remarks 
According to the proposal put forward here, it is neither the case that collective 
intentionality is reducible to individual intentions in the way classical analyses suggest, 
nor that it is a primitive form of intentionality backed up by specific Background 
capacities. Rather the specificity of collective intentionality lies in the interlocking 
character of the system of intentions involved. Thus, there is no need to posit a sui 
generis kind of psychological attitude, a we-intention, to account for collective 
intentionality. The common breed of intentions will do the trick, but their contents will 
be more complex than they are in the case of individual actions. What about Searle's 
requirements that an account of collective intentionality must be consistent with both 
individualism and internalism? The proposal advanced here is certainly consistent with 
individualism. All the intentionality there is in the head of individuals. The difference 
with Searle's account is to be found in the requirement that for the intentions of the 
individuals together to constitute collective intentions, they must  in fact be shared and 
not just be taken to be shared.  
The issue of internalism is more complex. Let us go back first to what Searle himself 
sees as an uncomfortable feature of his analysis, namely that it allows for a form of 
mistake that is not simply a failure to achieve the conditions of satisfaction of an 
intention but a more radical mistake concerning what type of state one is in. In other 
words, the hallucinating individual or the brain in a vat who thinks he is we-intending to 
do something is not only mistaken in his beliefs about the world, he is also mistaken in 
taking it that his intention is a we-intention. By contrast, the alternative analysis offered 
here does not allow for such a mistake, since it avoids postulating that the intentions 
possessed by agents involved in collective behavior are different in kind from individual 
intentions.  
To answer the question whether, on the proposed account, a brain in a vat could have a 
collective intention, one must first draw a distinction. On this account, an intention of an 
individual can properly be called a collective intention only insofar as it is part of an 
interlocking system of intentions. Obviously, if collective intentions are defined in this 
way a brain in a vat cannot be said to have collective intentionality. But the question 
                                                                                                                                               
facts, we should surely focus on the forms of collective intentionality that can give rise to novel types of 
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whether a brain in a vat can have collective intentionality can also be taken in a weaker 
sense. In this weaker sense, it becomes the question whether a brain in a vat could have 
an intention of a type such that it could, if circumstances are right, constitute an element 
in an interlocking system of intentions. Here, the answer may well be positive. A would-
be collective intention — that is, an intention fit to become an element in an 
interlocking system of intentions — is an intention the content of which makes 
reference in a certain way to the intentions of other members of a group. Provided one 
does not already have general objections to internalism, this case does not create 
problems of its own for internalism and thus supplies no new grounds to reject it.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
collective actions.     
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